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Until not so long ago, the received liberal
view of the history of biology and the social
sciences was that social Darwinist and racist
theories had been given the kiss ofdeath by
their association with the eugenic policies of
the Nazis. A revulsion from biological
determinism and any analogies between the
biological and social came to dominate the
post Second World War liberal consensus;
psychoanalysis was a vital part ofthis anti-
racist synthesis, since it offered a universal
psychology that could bridge the gap between
social theory and the somatic substrate of its
indeterminate (and non-biological) instinct
theory. In the 1970s, and more strongly in the
1980s, a number of seemingly unrelated
movements put the anti-racist and anti-
biologizing presuppositions into question.
With sociobiology, speculative applications of
biological models to social institutions once
again became permissible and "scientific".
With the rise ofidentity politics, racial,
religious and gender affiliations once again
became the primary categories for social and
historical analysis, this time by those whom
the shibboleths of liberal universalism had
attempted to protect from the damaging effects
ofracial prejudice masquerading as knowledge.
Gilman's books represent the triumph of
identity politics over these liberal shibboleths
in the history of medicine and psychoanalysis.
His working assumption is: no scientist can
ever forget, repress or do away with "his"
racial identity. When this is coupled with the
disease model ofcultural infection (so akin to
the fashionable culturalist-historicist
premises), according to which all inhabitants
of a medical culture inhabit the same cultural
universe, and are infected by the same
assumptions, its application to Freud yields the
following: "one of the definitions of the Jew
that [Freud] would have internalized was a
racial one, and it was a definition that, whether
he consciously sought it or not, shaped the
argument ofpsychoanalysis" (FRG3). To
secure this argument, Gilman asserts that "the
debate about race taints all other views of the
social reality of the period" (Case 175).
Anti-Semitism in Freud's milieu
In these two overlapping books, Gilman
argues with insistence and a wealth ofdetail
that Freud worked in a milieu that was not
only politically anti-semitic and discriminatory
against Jews, but also that the sciences of
which he was a practitioner were themselves
saturated with the discourse of race and the
pathologization of Jewishness. Gilman argues
that Freud created psychoanalysis as a reaction
formation to this medical and scientific
environment saturated with racism. Using a
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methodology that is culturalist and
psychoanalytic at the same time, Gilman takes
up a number of themes, some of them
seemingly minor-the meaning of
circumcision and its relation to disease and to
conversion from one religion to another, the
epidemiology of mental illness, the relation
between homosexuality and race, cancer and
Jewishness, the gaze of the Jew, penises and
noses, the flatfootedness ofthe Jews, incest
and criminality amongst the Jews. According
to Gilman, psychoanalysis is a displaced
answer to the accusations ofdifference and
pathology of those "racist" sciences which
preoccupy themselves with these themes. "The
idea ofthe Jew in the science that formed
Freud and other Jewish physicians at the turn
of the century is present in the images,
metaphors, and deep structures of his own
theory" (FRG42).
Freud, race and gender tries to argue a
series ofparallels: between the Jew and the
woman, between the Jew and the pervert,
between the Jew and the hysteric, between the
Jew and the homosexual. With each ofthese
parallels, Gilman attempts to demonstrate that
crucial features ofFreud's theories are
covertly modelled on, and thus mirror, debates
concerning the nature ofthe Jew (as pervert,
woman, homosexual, etc.). Gilman is
sometimes ingenious and interesting; often
bizarre and implausible; nearly always
instructive, since his work is based on
extremely wide reading in little known
sources; and almost never convincing. At
times, indeed, one feels that Gilman is
engaged in a sequence of ingenious historical
reveries, rather than arguments, on somewhat
eccentric themes-in The case ofSigmund
Freud, on the relation between penises and
noses, conversion and interbreeding, and flat
feet. In both books, he demonstrates an
uncanny knack for quoting a striking passage
that has no connection with the argument
under consideration,
An Absence ofEvidence
Gilman has written extensively on this
period of German medicine and, as in his
previous work, these books are remarkable for
their wealth of scholarship, both amongst
primary sources and in contemporary
historical and medical writings. Yet the
arguments of the two books face a
fundamental problem: the lack of evidence in
Freud's own writings to indicate that
Jewishness was a major element in the
development ofpsychoanalytic theory. Gilman
has a number of strategies to overcome this
problem. At times, he argues that the very
absence of this evidence speaks volumes;
indeed absence speaks louder than texts. At
other times, he assumes that Freud must have
been responding to his racist environment,
because he was culturally a part of it, and that
therefore the absence of evidence
demonstrates Freud's repression of this theme.
If the theme of race is repressed, it must, in
accordance with Freudian theory, return
somewhere, and Gilman knows where: "The
rhetoric of race was excised from Freud's
scientific writing and appeared only in his
construction of gender" (FRG37). The
denigration of the Jews that Freud implicitly
denies returns in his explicit denigration of
women: "Freud's discussion ofthe nature of
the female body, the distinction between male
Aryan and male Jew [i.e. circumcision] is
repressed, to be inscribed on the body ofthe
[castrated] woman" (FRG40). In other parts of
his argument, Gilman sees psychoanalysis as a
system having been hollowed out or mirroring
the anti-semitic discourse of its environment:
the topics ofthe Jewish body and psyche "are
countered in the rhetoric ofpsychoanalysis
through the construction of specific concepts
ofgender onto which the anxiety about the
Jew's body and mind (and, directly, Freud's
own body and mind) are displaced" (FRGI 1).
Another ofGilman's unconventional
methodological rules is the following: if Freud
cited a book on a particular topic, or
sometimes solely if he owned a particular
book, then the contents of the whole book can
be assumed to be implicit in his writing or his
references.
Let me give an example of Gilman's
analysis. Numerous medical writers of the
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eighteenth and nineteenth centuries posited
that male Jews were often born circumcised.
In the late nineteenth century, such a view was
bolstered by the widely accepted Lamarckian
inheritance ofacquired characteristics. Freud
was, like most contemporary biologists, a firm
believer in the Lamarckian mechanism, and, as
is well known, in the 1910s applied it to the
universal history ofmankind, with his view
that the castration complex was inherited as a
psychic disposition. Gilman implies on a
number ofoccasions that being a Lamarckian
on inherited characteristics necessarily evoked
and brought with it the "debate about the
inheritability of the sign ofcircumcision"
(FRG188). Ofcourse ifthis were true for
Freud, it would equally be true for Charles
Darwin and Ernst Haeckel. In addition, as a
student, Freud's first scientific research of
1877 was an evolutionary study ofthe hidden
gonads ofthe eel. Gilman weaves this material
together to advance a number oftheses; one of
these is that Freud, like other writers ofthe
time, believed in the existence of congenital
circumcision, ofthe "hidden, but omnipresent,
sign ofcircumcision" (FRG74). There is no
textual evidence for this view, and it is only by
ingenious juxtaposition of texts from different
hands at different times that Gilman gives the
impression that there is.
Or take Gilman's discussion of "the gaze of
the Jew". We find the following sentence in
both Freud, race andgender (p. 74) and in
The case ofSigmund Freud (p. 44): "At the
turn of the century, Sigmund Freud read this
view of the 'vivacity ofthe eye' as a sign of
the 'remarkable persistence' ofJewish
physiognomy." The fact that Freud is the
subject ofthe active verb in this sentence,
together with the inverted commas, gives the
impression that he is the author of the remarks
about the vivacity ofthe eye and the Jewish
physiognomy; however, if one wonders if
Freud actually said these things, and turns to
the footnotes (which are, intriguingly, slightly
different in the two books), we find that the
author is, on both occasions, one Carl Heinrich
Stratz, in his book Was sindJuden?; Stratz
was never once cited by Freud.
Jewishness versus the Universal
Thinking himself to have shown that the
discourse ofracial medicine and biology is the
fundamental backdrop to the development of
psychoanalysis, Gilman takes the next step in
his argument: Freud advanced key elements of
psychoanalysis-such as its theory of sexual
development and the Oedipus complex-as
universal generalizations precisely in order to
deny their local derivation from the problem
ofthe Jew. Thus the universality ofthe
Oedipus complex is "one male Jew's answer
to the charge of incest or inbreeding lodged
against the Jews" (Case 198) at the end ofthe
nineteenth century. Historians and critics of
analysis have often attempted to restrict its
universalist claims by showing how it is
rooted (and by implication, only applicable) in
the foetid atmosphere offin-de-siecle Vienna.
Now Gilman gives this culturalist thesis a new
twist, the racial twist: "it is the sexuality of the
Jew that is mirrored and distorted within the
Oedipus complex" (Case 207).
Gilman certainly does at times recognize
"Freud's resistance to the power of race"
(FRG48); but he is committed to seeing this
resistance as superficial. His commitment goes
so far as to be able to fly confidently in the
face ofthe absence ofevidence, an absence
that he himselfrecognizes: "The question of
the originality and creativity ofthe Jew,
especially the Jewish scientist, was central to
[Freud's and Wilhelm Fliess's] exchange, but
it was unspoken of in their letters" (FRG79).
The most appropriate verdict, then, on these
two magnificently erudite books comes from
Gilman's own pen: "Freud commented on
none ofthis. He wanted to move the argument
about the madness ofthe Jews away from the
question of race and to universalize it"
(FRG100). We must infer, reluctantly, that
Gilman's books prove the exact opposite of
their explicit theses, precisely because
Gilman's attempts to link his materials
together are so unconvincing. As an expose of
the wealth of medico-racist material
concerning the Jews at the end of the
nineteenth century, these are fine studies. But
unwittingly, Gilman has thereby made it even
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more palpable that Freud did indeed succeed
in giving a universal account of creativity,
madness and disease, did indeed, as Gilman
recognizes, "translate biology into
psychology" (FRG198). By quite rightly
insisting that historians examine its ubiquitous
presence, Gilman paradoxically makes it clear
how little of the surrounding ambience of
racial science and anti-semitism actually
affected or made its way into psychoanalysis
-a non-racial science that is implicitly
anti-racist. Gilman's books read to me like
courageous if failed experiments; but as the
philosophers of science tell us, failures are as
salutary as successes for the progress of
knowledge.
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